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Southern Cal. Edison v. State Dep’t of Taxation, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (Jul. 27, 2017)1
TAX LAW: USE TAX & THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Summary:
The Court considered whether an electrical utility company was entitled to a tax refund
after it had paid taxes under an alleged discriminatory taxation scheme. The Court held that the
company was not entitled to a tax refund because the company’s statutory construction argument
regarding NRS 372.270 in conjunction with NRS 372.185 would create absurd results. Moreover,
the company did not provide sufficient evidence demonstrating substantially situated competitors
who benefited from the unconstitutional taxation scheme. Finally, the Court found that the
company was not entitled to a tax credit for the money it paid to an out-of-state tax because the
tax was not a sales tax.
Background:
The Court considered whether Southern California Edison (“Edison”) was due a use tax
refund given Edison’s allegation that because it alleged to make the requisite showing of favored
competitors. Alternatively, the Court considered whether Edison is owed a tax credit in an amount
equal to the transaction privilege tax (TPT) levied by Arizona. Prior to this case, the Court
recognized that “[v]iolations of the dormant Commerce Clause are remedied by compensating for
the negative impact to the claimant as measured by the unfair advantage provided to the claimant’s
competitors.”2
Edison is an electrical utility company that owned a majority interest in the Mohave
Generation Station – a power plant that bought coal exclusively from Peabody Western Coal
Company (“Peabody”). Peabody extracted the coal in Arizona. Respondent State of Nevada
Department of Taxation (“Department”) levied a use tax on the coal Edison purchased from
Peabody, pursuant to NRS 372.185. Between March 1998 and December 2000, during Edison
and Peabody’s course of business, Edison paid $23,986,668 in Nevada use tax and $9,703,087.52
due to the Arizona (TPT).
Edison filed a claim against the Department and the Nevada Tax Commission for a refund
and/or tax credit – both of which were denied. As a result, Edison filed a claim in the district court,
which stayed Edison’s proceedings while awaiting the decision from Sierra Pacific. After Sierra
Pacific was decided, the district court concluded that NRS 372.270 was unconstitutional, however,
Edison was not entitled to a refund because it did not have any favored competitors that benefited
from the discriminatory taxation scheme.
Discussion:
On appeal, Edison advanced three arguments:
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(1) NRS 372.185 (use tax) and NRS 372.270 (use tax exemption) can be
harmonized to bring NRS 372.270 within constitutional parameters, and,
under this construction, Edison is entitled to a refund because the use tax
does not apply to coal purchases; (2) if the Court did not apply Edison’s
proposed statutory construction, NRS 372.270 is impermissibly
discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause and Edison made a
showing of advantaged competitors caused by NRS 372.270, thereby
entitling Edison to a refund pursuant to Sierra Pacific; and (3) if [the] Court
decides that Edison is not owed a refund, Edison is entitled to a tax credit
for the TPT Arizona levied on the coal’s production.3
NRS 372.270 cannot be harmonized with NRS 372.185 to bring it within constitutional parameters
Edison argued that NRS 372.270 is capable of being constitutional if it is harmonized with
NRS 372.185. With this construction, Edison’s coal purchases would qualify for the exemption in
NRS 372.270. In response to Edison’s statutory construction argument, the Court reviewed
Edison’s question de novo.4 The Court next looked to Nevada’s use and sales tax statutory scheme,
which is structured as follows:
Under Nevada law, sales and use taxes are complementary, yet mutually exclusive.
Sales tax applies to the sale of tangible personal property within the state. NRS
372.105. Conversely, use tax applies to the use, storage, and consumption of
tangible personal property within the state. NRS 372.185 … The use tax
complements the sales tax so that all tangible personal property sold or utilized in
Nevada is subject to taxation. Use taxation is also a way for Nevada to tax
transactions outside the state that would otherwise escape sales taxation. The
incidence of Nevada’s use tax falls directly upon the party that makes the out-ofstate purchase and uses property within the state.5
The Court found that NRS 372.185 imposes a tax on the use, storage, or consumption
purchased out-of-state that would have been a taxable sale if it occurred in Nevada, whereas NRS
372.270 exempted from sales and use tax the gross receipts from the sale, storage, use, or
consumption in Nevada. As a result, the Court found that NRS 372.270’s effect is to favor in-state
mines over out-of-state mines.
Edison Contended that NRS 372.270 could be read in a way that avoids interstate
discrimination citing the Court’s prior rulings regarding statutory interpretation, which state:
“[w]hen the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would render it
constitutional and valid and the other unconstitutional and void, that construction should be
adopted which will save the statute.”6
3

Southern Cal. Edison v. State Dep’t of Taxation, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 49, 5 (Jul. 27, 2017).
See I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC, 129 Nev. 139, 142, 296 P.3d 1202, 1203 (2013).
5
See State Dep’t of Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 280, 871 P.2d 331, 334–35 (1994).
6
See Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 619, 262 P.3d 1123, 1130 (2011) (quoting Virginia & Truckee R.R. Co. v. Henry,
8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873)).
4

However, the Court found that Edison’s reading of the statutes would produce absurd
results and therefore declined to adhere to Edison’s proposed construction.7 Edison’s reading was
absurd because it would confuse the location of the mine with the location of the sale. Furthermore,
Edison’s harmonization would also avoid net proceeds tax on its transactions with Peabody and
allow companies to completely avoid use, sales, and net proceeds taxation – which was not what
the legislature intended. The Court concluded, citing its language from Sierra Pacific, that NRS
372.270 was originally enacted only “to avoid taxing the proceeds of mines already subject to the
net proceeds tax.”8
Edison does not have substantially similar favored competitors that benefited from the
discriminatory taxation scheme
Next, Edison argues that if NRS 372.270 is not harmonized with NRS 372.185 consistent
with its proposed construction, the district court’s finding that NRS 372.270 is unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause should stand. Similarly, the Department also did not dispute
the district court’s determination that NRS 372.270’s tax exemption was unconstitutional so the
Court only considered Edison’s claim for a full refund of the taxes it paid on the coal purchase.
Edison contends that it presented the district court with adequate evidence of favored
competitors that would entitle it to a full refund under Sierra Pacific. The Court looked to an
excerpt of the district court’s holding, which stated: “there are no facts in the record to support a
finding that [Edison], by paying use tax on its purchase of the coal slurry, is being discriminated
against in comparison to a similarly situated tax payer” and that “[Edison] did not pay any higher
taxes than did its competitors.” For this finding of fact in the trial court, this Court could not reverse
“unless the judgment is clearly erroneous and not based on substantial evidence.”9 Moreover, the
Court also recognized that “[s]tate courts have the duty of determining the appropriate relief for
Commerce Clause violations, and, to satisfy due process requirements, courts must provide some
‘meaningful backward-looking relief’ to correct taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional
scheme.”10
The Court concluded that the proper analysis for determining whether favored competitor
to Edison existed would be to first answer the threshold question of whether the competitor was a
“substantially similar entity” to Edison before determining whether Edison was entitled to a
monetary remedy as a result of a dormant Commerce Clause violation.11 For a dormant Commerce
Clause violation to exist, the claimed discrimination must create a competitive advantage between
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these “substantially similar entities,” however the competitive markets are generally narrowly
drawn.12
Based on this analysis, and similar to the holding in Sierra Pacific, the Court found that
Edison does not compete against power companies that use coal mined within Nevada because
there is not enough coal to justify commercial operations.13 Therefore, because the Court declined
to draw the market in such a way to compare coal producers to producers of natural gas, solar, and
other sources of energy, Edison failed to prove there were any similarly situated coal producers
who were favored due to the taxation scheme.
Edison is not entitled to a tax credit based on the TPT paid to Arizona
Finally, Edison argues that even if a refund is not warranted, it is entitled to a $9,703,087.52
tax credit because it paid the TPT in Arizona. The Court first looked to the Nevada Administrative
Code, which states that the Department will allow a tax credit if the tax (in this case, for the TPT)
if the tax is considered to be a sales tax.14 Determining whether the TPT was a sales tax was a
question of law for the Court.15 Regarding the TPT, the Arizona Supreme Court and the Arizona
Department of Revenue have found that the TPT is to be distinguished from a sales tax; the tax is
on the privilege of doing business in Arizona and is not a true sales tax.16
Based on the findings from the Arizona Supreme Court, this Court found that the TPT was
not a true sales tax that would warrant Edison a tax credit. Furthermore, the Court found that even
if the TPT was a sales tax, it was Peabody who bore the cost of the tax and Edison was merely
reimbursing them.
Conclusion:
Edison is not entitled to any tax refund because NRS 372.270 could not be harmonized
with NRS 372.185 and Edison did not show that there were substantially similar competitors that
were advantage by the unconstitutional tax. Furthermore, Edison is also not entitled to a tax credit
because the TPT is not a sales tax within the meaning of NAC 372.055.
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